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Too Rough a Justice:
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission and
International Civil Liability for Claims for Rape
Under International Humanitarian Law
Ryan S. Lincoln*
The developments in international aw prohibiting rape dwing armed conflict have grown at
a rapid pace in recent decades. Whereas rpe had long been considered an inevitable by-product of
armed conflict, evolution in hternational humanitanan law (IHL) has relegated this conception
mostly to the past. The work of international crminal tibunals has been at the forefront of this
change, developing the specific elements of the international crime of rape, and helping to change
the perception of rape in international law Violations of IHL, however also give rise to civil
liability Despite the advances with respect to rape made in the international crminal law context,
non-criminal adjudication of claims for rape has been rare. Recently the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims
Commission completed eight years of work, making numerous damage awards for civil claims
based on violations of IlIL that occurred duing the war between those two states. Among the
claims that it heard were several claims for rape, brought by both parties Thus, the completed
work of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission represents an important opportunity to examine
civil adjudication of claims for rape under IHL.
This Article asks whether the work of the Commission has helped to extend the protections
afforded by IHL, and whether its treatment of the claims for rape is in line with the progress made
within IHL regarding the conceptualization of rape It locates and analyzes the work of the
Commission within the broader changes that have occurred withh IHL with respect to rape,
outlines the work of the Commission, and analyzes its substantive and procedural decisions. This
Article argues that, while the Commission contributed certain substantive and procedural advances
to IHL, it may have simultaneously created certain gaps in the JHL regime and hindered the
conceptuahzation ofmpe within IHL.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The past several decades have witnessed a fundamental change in
international law with respect to the norms prohibiting rape and sexual
violence during armed conflict.' Prior to World War II, international
legal prohibitions of sexual violence reflected a perception that acts of
rape and sexual violence were either property violations or honor
violations, and, inevitably, a by-product of armed conflict.2 While some
protections existed under international humanitarian law (IHL), norms
were vague and rarely applied by tribunals that adjudicated violations of
IHL. The advent of new legal categories such as crimes against
humanity, followed especially by the application of IHL by international
criminal tribunals, helped prompt a change in the perception of the
nature of rape and sexual violence and opened the door to the
development of norms with a greater degree of specificity, thereby
ushering in an era of greater accountability.
1. See K. Alexa Koenig, Ryan S. Lincoln & Lauren E. Groth, Contextualizing Sexual
Violence Committed Dunng the War on Terror: A Historical Overview of International
Accountability, 45 U.S.F. L. REV 911, 916 (2010); Mark S. Ellis, Breaking the Silence: Rape as
an International Crime, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 225, 227 (2006-2007).
2. See David S. M itchell, The Prohibition ofRape in International Humanitarian Law as
a Norm ofJus Cogens: Clariying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 219, 237 (2005);
see also Dustin A. Lewis, Unrecognized Victims: Sexual Violence Against Men in Conflict
Settings Under International Law, 27 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 22 (2009).
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After several decades of work by international judges, prosecutors,
advocates, activists, scholars, and others, IHL now includes more robust,
specific prohibitions against rape during armed conflict.' To date, the
prohibitions of rape under IHL have been applied predominately in the
context of international criminal tribunals, namely the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
As a body of law, however, IHL can also give rise to civil liability
and state responsibility.4 While international criminal tribunals have been
the loci of positive change and progressive development with respect to
the perceptions and prohibitions of rape under international law, they are
not the only engines of international law development, nor are they the
only legal mechanism by which the protections of IHL may be levied.
International claims practice-that is, international arbitration, mass
claims procedures, and state-to-state claims-is a means for bringing
claims for civil liability under fIL, and may thereby reinforce and
further develop IHL protections for those at risk of rape and sexual
violence during times of armed conflict in ways that are different, yet
complementary, to international criminal tribunals.
Yet, to date, there have been very few instances in which an
international tribunal has applied IHL to cases of rape in a non-criminal
context. Thus, there has been little opportunity to examine the
application of H1L norms developed primarily through criminal tribunals
when those norms are applied in non-international criminal law contexts.
Both real-world examples and scholarly attention to this phenomenon are
rare.
The most recent example of JIL application by a non-criminal
tribunal is the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission (the Commission),
which, over a course of eight years, adjudicated state-to-state claims and
some claims espoused by nationals, based on IHiL, committed during the
war between the two states that took place between 2003 and 2005.' On
August 17, 2009, the Commission rendered its final damages awards,
putting the capstone on a series of previously issued partial awards.'
3. This Article focuses specifically on rape-as did the Commission-rather than the
broader category of sexual violence.
4. Won Kidane, Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitanan Law: The
Jurisprudence of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in The Hague, 25 Wis. INT'L L.J. 23,
23-24 (2007).
5. See Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id= 1151 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).
6. Final Award, Eritrea's Damages Claim (Eri v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 512, 528, 37 (Eri.-
Eth. Claims Comm'n 2009).
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Among the various claims presented by both sides were claims for rape
of civilians, and the Commission's procedural and substantive decisions
with respect to these claims are important examples of international
claims adjudication applying IHL norms.
This Article examines procedural decisions and the jurisprudence of
the Commission in light of the evolution of international norms
prohibiting sexual violence as they have developed through application
of IHL by international criminal tribunals. It argues that, although
international criminal law and claims tribunals have important
differences, they should be examined not only side-by-side, but also as
complementary aspects of a common HIL regime. In many areas of
international law, various tribunals "borrow" from one another,
employing legal norms developed in a different legal context. But, in
doing so, application of international norms in different legal contexts
may fragment the cohesive legal protections that extend under the IL
regime. Violations of IHL can give rise to individual criminal
responsibility, civil liability, and also international state responsibility.
Nevertheless, IHIL norms with respect to rape have been developed
primarily in the criminal context. Little analysis has been given to the
ways that criminal and civil application and adjudication, based on
shared IIHL norms, can enhance or disrupt the protective regime of IHL.
This Article argues that the work of the Commission, while making
certain positive contributions to HIL norms with respect to rape, may
also have introduced gaps in the overarching, protective legal regime and
hindered the progress of how rape is conceptualized under international
law. Specifically, the Commission's finding of an obligation among
states to effectively prevent rape during armed conflict is an important
decision, especially in the reahn of civil claims for IHL violations.
Additionally, the procedural decisions with respect to evidence of rape
are significant, especially in light of the difficulty of adjudicating claims
of rape. However, failure to fully articulate the requirements of this norm
may have the unintended consequence of furthering wartime rape and
sexual violence. Moreover, the method of calculating and awarding
damages has more in common with property-based conceptions of
sexual violence, which is counter to the Commission's desire to ensure
that rape and sexual violence not be considered a mere by-product of
armed conflict.
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part H surveys the evolution of
international criminal law norms prohibiting sexual violence during
armed conflict. Part III analyzes the international law of state
responsibility with respect to international norms prohibiting sexual
388 [Vol. 20
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violence in order to contextualize the Commission's adjudication of state-
to-state claims. Part IV compares the adjudication of norms prohibiting
rape under international criminal law and civil adjudication of IHL
violations. Finally, Part V evaluates the Commission's jurisprudence
with respect to rape, arguing that the Commission's work, while laudable
in many respects, carries potential setbacks for advances made within
international law to safeguard against rape and sexual violence during
armed conflict, and Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL NORMS PROHIBITING SEXUAL
VIOLENCE'
In the decades following World War II (WWII), several
international tribunals have, through their work, extensively developed
international prohibitions against rape and sexual violence.' Perception
of the nature of the crime of rape has changed wholesale, acknowledg-
ment of the gravity of rape as an international crime has grown
considerably, and a proliferation of international tribunal jurisprudence
has brought the state of the law on this issue to maturity.
Viewed chronologically, the evolution of international norms
prohibiting rape falls into three genealogical categories. The early
period-from the Lieber Code of 1863 up to WWII-witnessed only
limited or approximate prohibitions of rape. The middle, developmental
period-from the tribunals following WWII to the ICTY and the
ICTR-saw the rapid development of specific international norms
prohibiting rape. Finally, the contemporary period-beginning roughly
with the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC)-unveiled
the arrival of a mature international doctrine prohibiting rape.' The
following sections provide a summary of the evolution of the doctrine.
A. The Early Period-Codes, Conventions, and World War II
Early prohibitions against rape were limited, often indirect, and
based on a parochial and paternalistic view of women and the severity of
sexually violent crimes."o For example, the earliest prohibitions against
rape based on international law in the United States come from the
Lieber Code of 1863, which contained prohibitions against rape,
7. See Koenig, Lincoln & Groth, supra note 1.
8. Id at 924.
9. See K. Alexa Koenig, Ryan S. Lincoln & Lauren Groth, The Jurisprudence of Sexual
Violence 3-31 (Sexual Violence & Accountability Project Working Papers Series, 2011)
(unpublished) (on file with the Human Rights Center, Univ. of California, Berkeley).
10. SeeKoenig, Lincoln & Groth, supra note 1, at 916-17.
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categorizing it as a crime of troop discipline." The 1907 Hague
Conventions sought to protect the "honor" of women during armed
conflict, but made no explicit condemnation of rape per se.12
WWII marked an important shift. No prosecutions for rape took
place during the Nuremberg Trials, and the corresponding Charter did
not contain any enumerated prohibitions against rape. The Nuremberg
Charter, however, introduced the legal category of crimes against
humanity." Control Council Law Number 10, adopted by the Occupying
Powers, included rape as a constituent act of crimes against humanity.4
This marked an important shift in international jurisprudence, from rape
as a property or "honor" violation to a violation of human dignity and
autonomy."
Trials in Japan following WWI had similarities to and differences
from the Nuremberg Trials. The charter establishing the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) did not explicitly prohibit
rape." The IMTFE did, however, prosecute and convict two individuals
for war crimes through a command responsibility theory for rape
committed by troops." These convictions, however, stand in stark relief
to the failure to prosecute those responsible for over 200,000 "comfort
women" held in Japanese rape camps.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols
further developed the international norms against rape. The Fourth
Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits rape, specifically naming rape,
enforced prostitution, and "any other form of indecent assault" among
the special protections afforded to women during times of conflict." The
Fourth Geneva Convention, then, made rape illegal, but failed to make it
11. Id. at 9I6.
12. See Ellis, supra note 1, at 228; Mitchell, supra note 2, at 237; see also Lewis, supra
note 2, at 2121-22.
13. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
14. See Koenig, Lincoln & Groth, supra note 1, at 915.
15. See Ellis, supra note 1, at 227; Mitchell, supa note 2, at 237; see also Lewis, supra
note 2, at 22.
16. See International Military Tribunal for the Far East, at 23, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1589.
17. Ellis, supa note 1, at 228.
18. YOSHIAKI YOSHIMI, COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY
DURING WORLD WAR 11 153 (Suzanne O'Brien trans., 1995); YUMA TOTANI, THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIAL: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 153 (2008).
19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
27, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
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prosecutable by not listing rape among the prosecutable grave breaches
of article 147.20
The 1977 Additional Protocols contained only minor additions with
respect to rape. Additional Protocol I explicitly prohibited rape of
women and prohibited enforced prostitution and indecent assault as
forms of outrage upon personal dignity.2' Nevertheless, Additional
Protocol I still left out rape from the enumerated list of prosecutable
grave breaches.22 Additional Protocol II extended the prohibition of rape
to all, without respect to biological sex.23 Most now recognize the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I as representative of
customary international law.
As a result of these various international legal developments, IHL
came to prohibit rape, even if it offered less than robust protection and
left the legal definition of rape ambiguous.24 Throughout the 1990s, new
developments in international jurisprudence would further expand the
law on rape.
B. The Developmental Stage-The International Cnminal Tnbunals
The ICTR and for the ICTY have been the most prominent
contributors to the development of international prohibitions of rape.
Prior to their creation, rape was clearly prohibited by 1IHL, but the
specific elements of rape were unclear.25 In response, the two tribunals
have developed a substantial and concrete body of relatively new
international law.26
Prosecutor v Akayesu (Akayesu), decided by the ICTR in 1998,
was the first significant decision in the line of cases developing the
20. Id. arts. 146-147.
21. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 76, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. PATRICIA VISEUR SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT: THE
IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS MEANS OF INTERPRETATION 7 (2007), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper Prosecution-of SexualViolence.pdf.
25. See, e.g., id.
26. Mitchell, supra note 2, at 240:
Successes include: expanding the definitions of crimes against humanity and genocide
to include rape; the participation of women in high-level positions and the inclusion of
staff sensitive to gender issues; effectively prosecuting various forms of sexual violence
as instruments of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, means of torture,
forms of persecution, and enslavement; and generally defining, clarifying, and
redressing gender-related crimes.
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international norms against rape. 27 Not only did the case directly address
charges of rape, but the decision contained two landmark holdings.
Akayesu was ultimately convicted for rape as a constituent act of crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide for his knowledge of,
presence at, and failure to prevent several acts of sexual violence that
occurred under his authority.28
In reaching this decision, the trial chamber made a landmark
determination that rape could satisfy the actus reus of crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and genocide. Moreover, the trial chamber, for the
first time, elucidated the elements necessary to prove rape. The trial
chamber defined rape as "a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive."29
Furthermore, an "invasion" could involve acts that did not involve
penetration or even physical contact between persons.30 The trial
chamber also took up the notion of consent, albeit indirectly, ruling that
coercion could be inferred from certain circumstances including armed
conflict." A finding of coercion-as in this case-precluded any
analysis of consent either as an element of the crime or as an affirmative
defense. Prosecutor v Musema followed the ruling in Akayesu,
solidifying the elements of rape delineated in the prior case.32
On the heels of Akayesu, the ICTY issued its own landmark
decision with respect to rape in Prosecutor v Funmdzifa (Furandzja),
finding that rape could constitute torture under international law." The
ICTY established its own definition of rape,34 and held that rape
constituted torture and was, therefore, a grave breach under common
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which had been incorporated into
the Charter of the ICTY" As such, Anto Furundzija, commander of a
military police unit in the Croatian Defense Council, was charged and
convicted of the war crime of torture by threatening to insert a knife into
27. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998),
http://www.inictr.org/Portals/0/Case\English\Akayesu\judgment\akay00l.pdf.
28. Id 1.
29. Id T 598.
30. Id. 688.
31. Id.
32. Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence 28
(Jan. 27, 2000), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case\English\Musema\judgment\000127.pdf.
33. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998), http://icty.org/x/cases/furundzijaltjvg/en/fur-tj98121 Oe.pdf.
34. Id. 1185 ("(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the
victim by the penis of the perpetrator .. .; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the
victim or a third person").
35. Id.
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the vagina of a victim and failing to intervene when the same victim was
forced to have oral and vaginal intercourse with another victim." The
appellate chamber affirmed the trial chamber's judgment in its entirety
upon appeal.
Prosecutor v Kunarac (Kunarac) marked yet another significant
development in the international jurisprudence of rape as it departed
from the Akayesu and Furundzifa elements by including a two-pronged
lack of consent requirement among the elements needed to prove rape."
Under this test, the trial chamber looked first to the consent or lack
thereof of the victim and, second, to whether the perpetrator knew of the
victim's lack of consent.39 The trial chamber reasoned that the consent
prong was needed to capture the essence of the crime of rape-violation
of a victim's sexual autonomy.40 This was the first time an international
tribunal examined consent directly, rather than inferring lack of consent
from inherently coercive circumstances. As a result, the ICTY in
Kunarac defined rape as:
[T]he sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the
victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the
perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the
perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of
the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a
result of the victim's free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding
circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual
penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the
victim.41
Ultimately, the trial chamber found Kunarac and his co-defendants,
ethnic Serbs who participated in ethnic cleansing activities in Republika
Srpska, guilty of rape as a war crime and as a crime against humanity, in
part, for implementing a holding facility used to systematically rape
Muslim women and girls.42
The trial chamber still left open the possibility for an inference of
nonconsent, holding that a defense of consent could not be offered if the
36. Id.138.
37. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgment 80-127 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, July 21,2001).
38. Prosecutor v. Dragoijub Kunarac, Radomir Kova6 and Zoran Vukovid, Case Nos. IT-
96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment 459 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 22,
2001).
39. SELLERS, suprd note 24, at 21.
40. Kunarac, Case Nos. It-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 1457.
41. Id. 460.
42. Press Release, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Judgment of Trial Chamber
II in the Kunarac, Kova6 and Vukovid Case (Feb. 22, 2001) (on file with author).
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facts showed the victim was threatened with or suffered "violence,
duress, detention or psychological oppression."43 The Appeals Chamber
upheld the trial chamber's decision, rejecting the defendant's argument
that a victim must show "continuous" or "genuine" resistance to
demonstrate lack of consent.'
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTR refined the issue of consent first
given in Kunarac in Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi(Gacumbitsi) .4 There, the
Appeals Chamber rejected the prosecution's argument that consent is
properly a defense, and not an element of the crime. Thus, the Appeals
Chamber reaffirmed that lack of consent of the victim and the knowledge
of lack of consent by the perpetrator must both be shown by the
prosecutor in order to prove rape.46 Again, lack of consent could be
inferred either by a showing of coercion or duress, or by demonstrating
the presence of coercive circumstances.47
Through their jurisprudence, the ICTR and the ICTY have given
proper gravity to the crime of rape, and underscored that rape is a
violation of dignity and bodily autonomy, rather than a property
violation. While both tribunals treat rape as a prosecutable offense only
as a constituent offense of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
genocide, they accomplished a great deal by clarifying the legal elements
of the international crime of rape.
C The Contemporary Perod-The International Cnminal Court
The ICC came to fruition upon ratification of the Rome Statute by
the sixty-sixth state party in July 2002.48 The ICC continued the
progressive trajectory of the ICTR and ICTY, ultimately going further
with the inclusion of prohibitions against sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other types of
sexual violence in its statute.49 Significantly, the ICC statute prohibits
these forms of sexual violence as stand-alone offenses, rather than as
43. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, 462.
44. Prosecutor v. Dragoijub Kunarac, Radomir Kova6 and Zoran Vukovid, Case Nos. IT-
96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment 125 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, June 12,
2002), http://icty.org/x/cases/kunarae/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf.




48. About the Cout INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+
Court/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
49. ANNE-MARIE L.M. DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR 85-86 (2005).
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constituent offenses."o Perhaps most significant is the Rome Statute's
declaration that rape is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions."
Specifically, the ICC statute defines rape as the following:
(1) The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of
the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening
of the victim with any object or any other part of the body.
(2) The invasion was conmiitted by force, or by the threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or
the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving
genuine consent.52
This definition reflects elements of force, coercion, and consent
developed throughout the ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence, and includes
specific language that allows for lack of consent to be inferred from
inherently coercive circumstances. Finally, the ICC's authority extends to
the ability to determine and award reparations to victims."
Thus, the application of IHL prohibitions against rape has reached a
relatively mature state in the context of international criminal law. In
comparison, the adjudication of IHL claims either for civil liability or
state responsibility is undeveloped. Violations of IHL can give rise to
liability for damages and trigger the international law of state
responsibility.54 However, it is unclear how IIHL norms developed
predominately in the criminal context can and should be applied in an
international claims tribunal and what results such application might
have for the body of IHL as a whole.
The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, thus, is an important case
study for answering these open questions. In order to adjudicate the
claims for rape brought before it, the Commission derived an obligation
incumbent upon states to effectively prevent rape of civilians during
armed conflict," and made certain procedural allowances in order to
50. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 190-99 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001).
51. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xxii), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.TS. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
52. Int'l Criminal Court, Report of Preparatory Comm'n for Int'l Criminal Court,
Elements of Crimes, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-1, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) (citations
omitted).
53. Rome Statute, supm note 51, art. 75.
54. See Kidane, suprd note 4, at 23.
55. Partial Award: Central Front-Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26
R.I.A.A. 120, 42 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n 2004).
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evaluate the evidence of rape presented by both states. While these
were novel and important advances under international law, this
obligation, and the mechanism by which the Commission chose to award
damages, has the potential to introduce gaps in the broader context of
IHL protections. The following section details the Commission's
jurisprudence with respect to claims for rape of civilians under IHL,
setting the background for an analysis of the implications of the
Commission's decisions.
III. INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS PROCESSES AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw-THE ETHIOPIA-ERITREA CLAIMS
COMMISSION
A. The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission
From May 1998 to June 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea engaged in an
international armed conflict that was ultimately brought to an end
through an international effort." The conflicting parties signed an
agreement in June that provided for a security zone to separate the
respective armed forces and requested deployment of a United Nations
peacekeeping force." The parties signed a permanent peace agreement
in December 2000 that established a Boundary Commission to delimit
the border between the two countries and created the Claims
Commission to adjudicate claims for "loss, damage, and injury resulting
from the conflict."" The Claims Commission, like the Boundary
Commission, was composed of five members: two chosen by each
respective state, with the chosen four selecting the fifth member.'
The first phase of the Commission's work established rules of
procedure, categories of claims, and types of remedies, and also
determined the scope of its jurisdiction." Then, from 2003 to 2005, the
Commission heard claims from both states and issued thirteen partial
awards ranging from claims of unlawful invasion (Eritrea) and killing of
56. Id 39,41.
57. Michael J. Matheson, Introductory Note to Eritreak and Ethiopia h Damage Clains,
49 I.L.M. 101, 101 (2010). For an excellent survey of the events giving rise to the Boundary and
Claims Commissions, see Christine Gray, The EritrealEthiopia Claims Commission Oversteps Its
Boundaries: A ParialAward., 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 699 (2006).
58. Matheson, supra note 57, at 101.
59. Id.
60. Michael J. Matheson, The Damage Awards of the Ethiopia-Ertrea Claims
Commission, 9 L. & PRAc. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 1, 2 (2010).
61. Matheson, supra note 57, at 101.
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civilians to property damage claims and improper treatment of prisoners
of war brought by each state against the other.62
Finally, the Commission evaluated the amounts of compensation to
be paid out and issued its final damages award on August 17, 2009.
Michael J. Matheson notes that throughout the proceedings several
mechanisms for relief had been considered, but most were rejected."6
Neither state chose to submit claims for fixed amounts for different
categories of individual claims, a mechanism the Commission had
created in its "Decision Number 5" that paralleled the method employed
by the U.N. Compensation Commission.6 ' Nor did the parties choose to
negotiate a lump-sum settlement that could then be allocated to
individuals.66 Ethiopia had proposed that the Commission not issue
damage awards, but rather create a mechanism to facilitate allocation of
international aid to those who suffered damages in both countries.6
Similarly, Eritrea suggested that rather than pursue monetary damages
for rape claims, each state should set aside money to provide health care
and support services for women." In the end, however, the Commission's
final damages awards were a function of limited time resources, available
evidence, and a strong sense of practicality.
Thus, in issuing the damages awards, the Commission chose to
"ma[ke] the best estimates possible on the basis of the available
evidence ... even if the process involv[ed] estimation, or even
guesswork, within the range of possibilities indicated by the evidence."
Nevertheless, the Commission did not issue damage awards in some
cases where proof of damage was not substantiated. In other cases-
such as rape, death of civilians, violence, or property loss-the
Commission issued damages even when evidence was sparse."
At conclusion, the Commission awarded approximately $161
million to the Government of Eritrea and approximately $2 million to
Eritrean individuals. The Commission awarded $174 million to the
Government of Ethiopia; thus, Ethiopia netted approximately $10
62. See Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, supm note 5.
63. Matheson, supra note 57, at 101.
64. Matheson, supra note 60, at 5.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id. at 6-7.
68. Id at 6.
69. Final Award-Eritrea's Damages Claim, supra note 6, 37. It is important to note
that the damages have not been paid. See Annual Report Eritrea 20II, AMNESTY INT'L USA
(May 28, 2011), http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-eritrea-2011.
70. Matheson, supra note 60, at 7-8.
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million." Matheson has noted that the results of the awards going
forward are uncertain.7 2  There is no dedicated pool of funds to
automatically pay out awards and ultimately the paying of awards
depends on the "willingness and ability" of the two resource-poor
governments." Matheson notes a few possibilities that are open to the
governments if the awards are not paid out, including offset or seeking
enforcement through attachment or lawsuit in jurisdictions in which the
opposing state has assets.74
Moreover, Matheson notes that the claims are mostly state-to-state
claims and not claims directed to specific individuals, and that the net
amount of $10 million that is owed to Ethiopia is far too small to cover
the full range of damages sustained by the armed conflict." As such, the
two governments would receive any payments and would retain
discretion to keep the payments, distribute them to the individuals who
incurred damages, or create an alternative method of providing assistance
or relief to those who suffered damages.
Scholarly attention to the Claims Commission has been limited to
date, but commentators have agreed that the jurisprudence and work of
the Commission contains several important advancements for civil
adjudication of violations of IHL." Won Kidane states that while
violations of IHL are compensable under article 3 of the Fourth Hague
Convention, actual adjudications of violations have been rare, making the
work of the Commission an important development." In another article,
Matheson lists several substantive and procedural findings (including the
Commission's decisions on evidence with respect to rape discussed
below) that he considers important outcomes of the Commission's
work.79
J. Romesh Weeramantry argues that, despite the time and resource
constraints placed on the Commission, its work resulted in several
decisions with "practical detail that . . . will provide a useful guide to
understanding and applying rules of international humanitarian law."o In






77. Id; Kidane, supa note 4, at 44.
78. Kidane, supra note 4, at 44.
79. Matheson, supm note 60, at 3-5.
80. J. Romesh Weeramantry, Pisoners of War (Eitrea v Ethiopia), Eritreak Claim 17/
Ethiopia & Claim 4, Partial Awards, Central Front (Entrea v Ethiopia), Etea & Claims 2, 4, 6, 7
8 & 22/Ethiopia k Claim 2, Partial Awards, 99 AM. J. IrNT'L L. 465, 471 (2005).
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particular, he references the decisions regarding the standard of first aid
treatment to be given to POWs, indicators of substandard medical care in
POW camps, and the extent of the obligation to repatriate POWs."
Additionally, he comments that the awards underscore the "mandatory
nature" of rules of customary international law as embodied in both the
Hague and the Geneva Conventions and will help solidify the customary
status of Additional Protocol I.82
Nevertheless, Weeramantry does level some criticism at the
Commission. He says the Commission could have done more with
credible evidence of isolated incidents of serious violations of IL, such
as rape and unlawful killing of POWs." He writes:
A failure to act upon evidence pointing to serious, but isolated, violations
of universally accepted standards of humanitarian law sends out the wrong
message. The point here is that a postconflict adjudication process must, as
far as is possible, avoid giving the impression that isolated violations of
humanitarian law are not sufficiently important-in the context of a large-
scale armed conflict-to warrant investigation or to attract state and,
possibly, individual responsibility.8 4
The Commission's jurisprudence with respect to each state's claims
for rape has received praise but little in-depth analysis. These decisions
are indeed praiseworthy in some respects, but, when examined in the
fuller context of the Commission's work, with respect to the protective
purposes of IHL, and in light of the progressive development of
international prohibitions of rape, they reveal noteworthy weaknesses.
B. Allegations and Comments with Respect to Rape
Among the full range of claims presented by both parties to the
Commission were several claims of rape." The Commission determined
that allegations of rape were worthy of special treatment-due to the
difficulty of obtaining evidence of rape and the cultural taboo of
discussing sexual violence-and carved out its comments on rape from
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 472.
84. Id.
85. See Partial Award: Central Front-Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, & 22, supra note 55,
136-45, 80-81; Partial Award: Central Front-Ethiopia's Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 159,
1 34-40 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n 2004); Partial Award: Civilians Claims-Ethiopia's Claim 5
(Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 249, % 83-90 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n 2004); Partial Award:
Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims-Eritrea's Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21,
25 & 26 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 291, 74-83 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n 2005); Partial Award:
Western and Eastern Fronts-Ethiopia's Claims I & 3 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 351, 49-56,
68-69 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm'n 2005).
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its analysis of other claims. The Commission, implicitly aligning itself
with the current state of the law with respect to rape under international
law, made it clear that it did not consider rape to be an inevitable by-
product of armed conflict. Thus, in order to actually adjudicate claims
for rape in light of a lesser quantity of evidence than might otherwise be
needed, the Commission adopted the special procedural rules, discussed
below, and carefully laid out the legal standard by which it would rule on
the parties' rape claims.
Here, just as in the other claims, the Commission applied IHL.
More specifically, the Commission turned to "customary international
law, as reflected in the Geneva Conventions'"' and measured the claims
of the parties against common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and article 76.1 of
Additional Protocol I." The Commission did not turn to the definitions
of rape developed through the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, and
ICC. Rather, taking the above provisions together, the Commission
found an international obligation for states to protect women civilians
from rape during armed conflict, and evaluated the claims of both states
against this obligation."
In the partial awards, the Commission laid out the special
evidentiary considerations that it took before discussing the merits of the
claims. First, the Commission adapted its fact-finding criteria in light of
the cultural context surrounding rape. Both parties had suggested the
sensitive nature of rape in their culture made victims unlikely to come
forward and made witnesses unlikely to give specific or detailed
testimony, especially compared to non-sexual offenses." Thus, the
Commission abandoned its normal evidentiary requirement of "clear and
convincing evidence" of a pattern of "frequent or pervasive" violations,
instead setting the threshold at "several" incidents of rape."o Rape, said
the Commission, "involves intentional and grievous harm to an
individual civilian victim, [and] is an illegal act that need not be frequent
to support State responsibility."9'
With these considerations in place, the Commission focused its
inquiry on specific geographic regions "where large numbers of
opposing troops were in closest proximity to civilian populations . . . for
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the longest periods of time."9 2 Such situations, stated the Commission,
posed the highest risk of sexual violence, a fact that Eritrea and Ethiopia
must have known. As such, the two states were "obligated to impose
effective measures, as required by international humanitarian law, to
prevent rape of civilian women.""
Eritrea put forth a claim for several rapes perpetrated in Senafe
Town by Ethiopian soldiers in its Central Front Claims.94 As evidence,
Eritrea offered several eyewitness accounts of rapes, the testimony of a
Mdicmns Sans Frontieres physician serving in the area, and the testimony
of another physician that supported the occurrence of several rapes."
The Commission found that Eritrea had made a prima facie case of
breach on this claim." Moreover, the Commission ruled that Ethiopia
failed to rebut Eritrea's claim. Although Ethiopia tried to prove that rape
complaints were investigated, that soldiers were arrested, and offered
evidence of its IHL compliance training, this evidence was not enough to
rebut Eritrea's claim." Therefore, Ethiopia was found liable for "failure
to take effective measures to prevent rape by its soldiers of Eritrean
civilian women.""
Ethiopia, too, presented claims for rape among its Central Front
Claims. As evidence, Ethiopia offered information from the Tigray
Women's Association that had registered twenty-six rapes in Irob
Wereda, which was corroborated by a government official who had
investigated rapes in the area and put the number at thirty-five.99 Other
eyewitnesses, including local clergymen, also reported rapes by Eritrean
soldiers.'oo The Commission found this evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie case that Eritrea did not attempt to rebut.'0 ' Thus, the
Commission also found Eritrea liable for "failure to take effective
measures to prevent rape by its soldiers of Ethiopian civilian women." 02
Ethiopia also brought claims for rape in its Western and Eastern
Fronts Claims.'03 Its evidence for the Western Front Claims consisted of
92. Id 42.
93. Id.









103. Partial Award: Western and Eastern Fronts-Ethiopia's Claims 1 & 3, supra note 85,
IM 49-56.
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five witness declarations-out of a total of approximately 200
declarations filed under this claim that were "extremely spare in their
mention of or allusion to rape."' The Commission determined that the
small number of declarations and their limited details were not enough to
establish a prima facie case and thus the claim failed for lack of proof."'
There was, however, more evidence of rape in Ethiopia's Eastern
Front Claims. For these claims, Ethiopia submitted ten witness
declarations and a "credible and particularly troubling" eyewitness
account of a gang rape.o' Eritrea did not rebut these claims, and the
Commission found Eritrea liable for failure to impose effective measures
on its troops in order to prevent these rapes."o
Ethiopia's Claim 5-Civilians Claims also included allegations of
rape. The Commission noted that of the 402 declarations and claims
forms offered by Ethiopia under Claim 5, twelve included counts of
rape.' 8 Eritrea defended these allegations by pointing to the role of the
International Committee for the Red Cross in inspecting detention
facilities, which it argued would curb abuse, and offered a UNICEF
report that found thirty-four percent of Ethiopian women returning from
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Ethiopia had been raped by
Ethiopian soldiers.'O9  The Commission found Eritrea's evidence
persuasive, not as a rebuttal of Ethiopia's claims, but rather as evidence
that prevented Ethiopia from making a prima facie case."0 In its partial
award for Ethiopia's Claim 5, the Commission was careful to note,
however, that it was not a criminal tribunal, nor was it "charged with
assessing ... liability in individual instances of violation of international
humanitarian law.""' Its finding here of no liability was not indicative,
the Commission maintained, of disbelief of the evidence or inadequate
appreciation of the gravity of the offenses."2
Eritrea, too, included additional claims of rape in its Western Front
series of claims."' To support these allegations, Eritrea offered twenty-










113. Partial Award-Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea's
Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25, & 26, supra note 85, % 74-84.
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two came from eyewitnesses."4  Additionally, Eritrea offered the
testimony of two doctors who testified about rapes, and an Australian
television documentary that contained interviews with eight women who
said they were victims of rape or attempted rape."' Considering the
evidence in light of the difficulties posed by the quality of the evidence,
the Commission determined Eritrea had presented an unrebutted, prima
facie case and found Ethiopia liable for failure to impose effective
measures on its troops.' 6
There are two noteworthy observations about the Commission's
findings with respect to rape. The first concerns the nature of the
obligations that Ethiopia and Eritrea were found to have breached. The
second concerns the jurisprudence employed by the Commission to
reach its findings of liability. Both will be discussed in turn below.
First, the Commission did not find either state liable for rape per se.
Rather, each state was found liable for the failure to take effective
measures to prevent the rape of civilians by their respective troops. In
other words, the Commission considered each state under an
international obligation to prevent the rape of civilian women. Evidence
of rape in sufficient quantity, then, amounted to a breach of this
obligation. Liability for this breach of duty thus extends to the state
responsible for the failure of prevention, but this raises the question of to
whom was the duty owed.
The Geneva Conventions, based on customary international law
applied by the Committee, seem to suggest that the obligation is owed to
civilians. The conventions were designed to protect civilians. The state
does not breach its obligation to provide effective measures of prevention
unless civilians have been raped. Yet the Commission found and
imposed an affirmative obligation upon the states to prevent the rape of
civilians by its troops.
Second, the Commission used an outcome-oriented presumption to
reach its legal conclusions. Rather than rape as an element of breach, the
Commission used rape as a presumption of breach. That is, evidence of
rape by soldiers of one state, in sufficient quantity, creates a presumption
of state responsibility for that state. In other words, evidence of the
outcome-rape-presumes the breach of the obligation to provide
effective measures of prevention.
In the Commission's jurisprudence, it is unclear how much
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facie case. In the one instance in which Eritrea put forward sufficient
evidence to prevent a favorable ruling for Ethiopia, the Commission,
instead of determining that Eritrea had rebutted Ethiopia's claim,
determined that Ethiopia had failed to make a prima facie case. It is
unclear whether the defending state could put forward evidence of
sufficient quantity and type to rebut allegations of responsibility for rape
or whether the existence of incidences of rape led automatically to a
conclusion of responsibility.
C State Responsibility
The process for assessing the international responsibility for a
violation of international law is different than that for international
criminal trials. Under the international law of state responsibility, the
breaching state is responsible for the breach when an actor breaches an
obligation of international law, which causes damage either to another
state or an individual, and the wrongful act can be attributed to the
breaching state."'
When international responsibility is engaged, the breaching state is
obligated to make reparations unless circumstances precluding wrongful-
ness exist."' Moreover, the reparations-be it restitution, compensation,
or satisfaction-must, as much as possible, eradicate the consequences
of the illegal act."' When the breach is of an obligation owed to an
individual, the historic view was that the state of nationality of the
individual could espouse the claim.'20 This position, however, has
evolved-particularly in light of the development of the international
human rights regime and corresponding interest in protecting the rights
of individuals. There now exists a limited range of claims that
individuals might make for breaches entailing state responsibility.2 '
In 2001, the International Law Commission completed its work on
codifying the law on state responsibility, which resulted in the Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
117. Francisco Orrego Viculia, Claims, International, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUB. INT'L L. 11, http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber-article?script-yes&id=/epil/entries/law-
9780199231690-el7&recno-13&subject-Intemational%20responsibility (subscription required)
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
118. See Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
17, at 27-29, 31 (Sept. 13); see also Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess. Apr.-June, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, § 31, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instru
ments/English/commentaries/9_6-200 .pdf.
119. Factory ofChozdw, 1928 PC.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47.
120. Vicuia,supranote 117,1 1.
121. Id T3.
404 [ Vol. 20
RAPE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Draft Articles). 22 The Draft Articles purport to be a set of "secondary
rules" that determine when a state is responsible for a breach of an
international obligation.'23 Fault-that is, the determination of when a
breach has occurred-is a notion that pertains to "primary rules," which
encompass the specific international obligations themselves.124
James Crawford, the final Special Rapporteur of the Draft Articles,
emphasizes the distinction between the two stages. He argues that the
primary rules are those obligations that states have with respect to other
states.'25 The secondary rules, he says, developed out of the emergence of
a "general conception of the rights and duties of states, and of the
consequences of breaches of those rights."'26 Ultimately, "[i]t is not the
function of the law of state responsibility to tell states what obligations
they may have," 27 but rather to lay out the relationship of rights and
duties among states vis-A-vis the obligations to which they have
consented. Nevertheless, the Draft Articles, while focusing on the
traditional primacy of states as the subjects of international law,
recognize there are certain rights that pertain to individuals and may be
breached by states.'28
Assessing international state responsibility, then, is a multistage
process, requiring both interpretation and application. More specifically,
application of the general obligation of states vis-A-vis one another, or
other actors to whom states owe obligations, requires interpretation of the
specific international norms that apply between the states or the
obligations states have toward other actors, analysis of the on-the-ground
facts to determine whether breach has occurred, and, finally, an
assessment of attribution. In this case, the process of determining breach
and assessing attribution requires interpretation both of the content of lex
specialis norms of armed conflict but also what the obligations require of
states, and what types and degree of derogation from the obligations
constitute a breach.
First, a tribunal must determine if a breach of an international
obligation, called an "internationally wrongful act," has occurred.'29 To
122. See Draft Articles, supra note 118.
123. See Daniel M. Bodansky & John R. Crook, Symposium on the ILCk State
Responsibility Articles: Introduction and Overview, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773, 779 (2002).
124. Id
125. James Crawford, The ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
WrongfulActs: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 874, 878-79 (2002).
126. Id at 876.
127. Id. at 878.
128. Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-Fst Century, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 799, 809 (2002).
129. See Draft Articles, supra note 118, art. 1.
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do this, the tribunal looks to the parameters of the specific obligation to
determine if a particular act or omission amounts to a breach. The
tribunal must also determine whether the obligation exists between the
states or other actors in question.'30
Second, the tribunal must turn to the law of state responsibility to
determine if that breach is attributable to the state. Chapter II of the
Draft Articles delineates those entities whose actions or omissions can
give rise to state responsibility and includes state organs,'' individuals,
and entities exercising state authority,'32 organs of one state placed at the
disposal of another state,"' and even conduct of an insurrectional
movement that becomes the new government of that state.1" If the act or
omission was committed by one of the given entities, then the tribunal
can look to see if there are "circumstances precluding wrongfulness."'35
Circumstances, if proven, that might preclude state attribution include
consent, self-defense, countermeasures, force majeure, distress, and
necessity.'3 If the tribunal does not find any circumstances precluding
wrongfulness, attribution attaches to the breaching state, and it may incur
several legal consequences including obligations of cessation,
nonrepetition, and reparation.'13
Although the Commission did not explicitly apply the Draft
Articles, the determination of state responsibility and awarding of
damages for rape and all other claims was the central purpose of the
Commission.
The Commission's approximate adherence to the method of analysis
inherent to the Draft Articles is evident. First, the Committee began by
analyzing the primary rules to determine the nature of the obligations.
Here, the relevant international obligations stem from customary
international law embodied in IHL, specifically common article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and
article 76.1 of Additional Protocol I. In the confluence of these
provisions, the Commission isolated an international obligation of states
to protect women civilians from rape during armed conflict.'
130. Id art. 13.
131. Id art.4.
132. Id. art. 5.
133. Id. art. 6.
134. Id art. 10.
135. Id arts. 20-27.
136. Id arts. 20-25.
137. Id arts. 30-31.
138. Partial Award: Central Front-Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, supra note 55, T 37.
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Next, with the pertinent obligation identified, the Commission
looked for evidence of breach. As discussed above, the Commission
found evidence of breach by using a rebuttable, outcome-oriented
presumption. "Several" rapes amounted to presumptive evidence of a
breach of the obligation to provide effective measures to prevent the rape
of women civilians.
Finally, the Committee was left to assess state responsibility. The
Committee made no specific inquiry into whether those actors who
committed the rapes were the type of actors for which states may be held
responsible. Since the claims were based on allegations of rape by
soldiers in the regular armed forces of the respective states, their conduct
certainly falls under article 4 of the Draft Articles as an "organ ... of the
state," but the Commission did not make an explicit finding on this
point. 139
Similarly, the Commission did not make a specific inquiry into
circumstances precluding wrongfulness. This is potentially an interesting
omission. On the one hand, it is impossible to imagine a circumstance
that would preclude the wrongfulness of rape. But it is important to
remember that neither state was found responsible for rape, but rather for
the failure to provide effective measures to prevent the rapes. If the
commission of "several" rapes creates a rebuttable presumption of
breach, then the respondent state has two strategies for defense. The
respondent state can attempt to provide evidence to rebut the
presumption. In this case, evidence would need to show that the
respondent state did, in fact, employ effective measures to prevent rape.
The measures, however, must be "effective" and not reasonably effective,
which seems to create an impossibly high hurdle for a respondent state to
overcome. In other words, the occurrence of rape demonstrates the
ineffectiveness of any preventative measure.
Alternatively, the respondent state could have tried to argue for
circumstances precluding wrongfulness. This line of defense is not
available if the claims are for rape per se, but might offer limited lines of
defense for claims of breach of the obligation to take effective measures
to prevent rape. It is conceivable that there could be a set of
circumstances that might appear in a force majeure defense-such as
lack of resources to provide effective preventative measures or training.
However, this line of argument would probably prove unpersuasive.
Consent, self-defense, necessity, or distress would be unavailing
139. See Draft Articles, supr note 118, art. 4.
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arguments in this context. In the absence of circumstances precluding
wrongfulness, attribution for the breach flows to the state.
IV. INDIVIDUAL V. MASS-COMPARING INTERNATIONAL NORMS
PROHIBITING RAPE AND THE COMMISSION'S JURISPRUDENCE OF
RAPE
To the careful observer, jurisprudence from the international
tribunals on the subject of rape offers a few points of comparison to the
jurisprudence of the Claims Commission. The international tribunals
from Nuremberg to the ICC were criminal tribunals, concerned with the
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As such, they
applied-and with respect to rape, developed and clarified-
international criminal law norms related to armed conflict. As criminal
tribunals, they heard specific charges, with identifiable legal elements
against discrete individuals for the purposes of prosecuting those accused
of violating IHL. These tribunals had procedural issues, evidentiary
requirements and standards, burdens of proof, and stakes riding on the
outcome of the trial that were appropriate and unique to the criminal trial
context.
In contrast, the Commission was an international claims process,
more akin to a mass claims tribunal, and had the mandate to determine
state, not individual, responsibility. The purpose of the Commission was
to:
decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by
one Government against the other, and by nationals (including both natural
and juridical persons) of one party against the Government of the other
party or entities owned or controlled by the other party that are (a) related
to the conflict that was the subject of the Framework Agreement, the
Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement, and (b) result from violations of international humanitarian
law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations of
international law. 40
The Commission was not charged with, nor did it attempt to, investigate
or assess any criminal liability related to the conflict between Eritrea and
Ethiopia. The Commission's procedural rules, analysis of evidence,
burdens of proof, and goals were adopted to serve its specific purpose of
adjudicating claims for damages incurred as a result of violations of IHL
that occurred during an international armed conflict. The nature of the
140. Edtrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 5 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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claims advanced by the states, the remedies sought, and even the
obligations analyzed by the Commission were appropriate to the claims
context.
Because of these contextual differences, many types of comparison
are inappropriate. For example, though rape is at issue in both the
criminal tribunals discussed above and in the Claims Commission, the
nature of the claims are different. In the criminal context, the charges of
rape were charges of rape per se, even if the defendants were being
prosecuted for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity (crimes
for which rape constitutes an element of the greater offense).14' In the
Commission, the states may have brought claims for rape per se, but the
Commission awarded damages based on states' failures to provide
effective measures to prevent rapes. Thus, the very legal obligations
under consideration are different, much less the types of evidence needed
or the standards required to satisfy proof of breach or criminal
responsibility.
Moreover, the differences between mass claims processes versus
individual processes, state responsibility compared to individual
culpability, and even the legal and geopolitical purposes for which these
tribunals were created might preclude a one-to-one comparison.
Nevertheless, the difference between the "mass" nature of the state
responsibility context and the "individualized" nature of criminal
prosecution, however, may not be as great in the case of international law
with respect to rape as it first seems.
First, there are important "mass" aspects to the criminal cases.
Crimes against humanity and genocide each have elements that refer to a
collectivity.42 Crimes against humanity require a showing that a rape was
"part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."'43 Genocide,
similarly, requires proof that rape was "committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."'
Doris Buss argues that while these crimes do entail the individual
act of the rape in question, as charged in the ICTY and ICTR (as either
crimes against humanity or genocide), rape is a crime against a
community of persons.14'5 This is not unlike the Commission's finding in
141. In the ICTR and ICTY cases that dealt with rape, rape served as a constituent element
to satisfy actus reus requirements of genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes.
142. Doris E. Buss, Rethinking 'Rape as a Weapon of War,' 17 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD.
145, 150 (2009).
143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Id
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the Commission -breach of the obligation to effectively prevent rape
required proof of "several" rapes. Second, in both contexts, the entity
held responsible, whether criminally responsible or liable for damages, is
singular. Individuals are held responsible through international criminal
trials; individual states are found responsible under the law of state
responsibility.
But rather than simply evaluate international criminal tribunals and
international claims processes side-by-side, as above, the more important
question is how, and to what extent, are these two international legal
mechanisms interrelated aspects of the overarching body of IHL.
Criminal tribunals and international claims processes that apply IHL may
work in tandem, levying criminal responsibility and state liability where
appropriate. The complex social and political situations that give rise to,
and result from, armed conflict surely require a multifaceted and nuanced
approach that is beyond the reach of a single type of tribunal.'46
Lucy Reed has made a compelling case that international criminal
tribunals and international claims processes are complementary
components of an international legal response to violations of IHL.'47
Reed argues that international criminal law prosecutors and those that
practice international arbitration-or what she calls international claims
practice-approach their respective tasks from opposite directions.'48
Prosecutors, she says, are primarily concerned with punishing the
perpetrators of international crimes in the hope that prosecutions will
deter future conduct and reduce future violations.'49 The goal of
international claims practice, on the other hand, is to "compensate or
otherwise directly relieve the suffering of victims of past international
law violations, criminal or civil."'s
Despite the differences, both approaches can advance the same
goal, help to restore dignity and bring closure to victims, and can
"creat[e] a synergy and magnify[] the results of what each group does.""'
Reed makes a case for the continued separation of criminal prosecutions
146. Some have argued that international criminal proceedings may be an inadequate
response to rape during armed conflict because they focus on punishment of the perpetrator rather
than allowing for any compensation to the victim. See Christine Chinkin, RapeandSexualAbuse
of Women in InternationalLaw, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 326, 337 (1994).
147. Lucy Reed, International Claims Tibunals: What International Crminal Prosecutors
Might Need To Know, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
DIALOGS: AUGUST 25-26,2008 AT THE CHAUTAUQUA INSTITUTION 207,207 (Elizabeth Anderson &
David M. Crane eds., 2009), availableathttp://asil.orgpdfslucyspeechchautauqua.pdf.
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and claims procedures.152 She says that criminal prosecutions must be
"slow and careful" to provide fair trials, while victims need the "rough
justice" of claims processes in order to regain dignity and rebuild lives.'
Reed highlights a few distinctive characteristics of mass claims
processes with a particular eye toward the way efforts aimed at reparation
differ from efforts focused on deterrence.15 First, she notes that claims
processes typically group victims into categories and give remedies in
two discrete forms: either reparations or restitution.' The principle of
what she calls "rough justice"-that is, giving an award to as many
people as possible-is justified because at least some justice is better
than none.'56 Second, she states that mass claims processes use a "very
low" standard of proof, more akin to arbitration or administrative
proceedings.' This standard is justified, she argues, due to the lack of
evidence or sheer number of claims."' In such cases, she gives examples
of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) and the
Bosnia-Herzegovina Real Property Commission, the commissions often
employ presumptions to arrive at the award of claims.' Furthermore,
the low evidentiary standard is legitimate because the proceedings are
concerned primarily with the "fact" of loss rather than the "fault" for
loss.' Third, mass claims processes must use "mass claims techniques"
to deal with the inundation of claims that are necessary to give
compensation fairly and quickly to those in need."'
Finally, Reed makes a few comments with respect to the
Commission, ongoing at the time of her remarks, which are
noteworthy.'62 She highlights the fact that the Commission is not a mass
claims process, but rather a tribunal in which the respective states are
espousing their nationals' claims.' Nevertheless, she says the
Commission shares the features of "rough justice" and the claims are
based on classes of people.'" Of particular importance, she states the
152. Id. at 220.
153. Id. at 220-21.
154. Id. at 212.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 214.
157. Id. at 215.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 216.
160. Id. at 217-18.
161. Idat218.
162. Id. at 219.
163. Id
164. Id. at 219-20.
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Commission has found the respective states liable for various violation of
IHL.65
If Reed is correct-and her arguments are compelling-that
international criminal law and international claims processes can work
toward advancing the same goal, then the work of the Commission with
respect to rape can and should be evaluated in light of the international
norms that prohibit rape and the progress that has been achieved within
the international community about the nature of rape during armed
conflict. Moreover, if criminal adjudication and claims process
adjudication are to work as complementary means of enforcing EIL and
advancing the protective goals of IHL, then it is important to analyze
whether the Commission's awards with respect to rape do, in fact,
dovetail with the work done by the international criminal tribunals.
Again, both the criminal tribunals discussed above and the
Commission applied IHL, a body of law designed to protect persons at
risk during armed conflict.'" Marco Sass6li argues that many of the
obligations under IHL are framed in a "human rights-like manner as
entitlements of war victims."' The obligations that protect persons from
rape and sexual violence, with their concern for the protection of human
dignity, fall squarely in this category. If this is the case, and, further, if
international claims processes and international criminal law are
complementary mechanisms for enforcing IHL, then the question is: to
what extent did the Commission's awards with respect to rape further the
goal of international humanitarian law with respect to rape? Put another
way, did the Commission's jurisprudence uphold and/or enhance the
protections from rape envisioned by IHL, thereby safeguarding human
dignity? Moreover, did the Commission's awards adequately remedy
those violations of dignity brought before the Commission?
V. EVALUATING THE RESULTS OF THE COMMISSION
A. Does the Commission Juisprudence Advance the Goals of
International Humanitanan Law?
The IHL regime-from customary rules to the Hague tradition to
the current widespread acceptance of the Geneva Conventions-has been
165. Id.at220.
166. See Marco Sass6li, State Responsibiity for Violations of International Hurnanitarian
Law, 84 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 401, 401 (2002) ("Although international humanitarian law came
into being ... as a law regulating belligerent inter-State relations, it has today become nearly
irrelevant unless understood ... namely as a law protecting war victims against States and all
others who wage war.").
167. Id. at 419.
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developed and adapted in order to protect civilians and those hors de
combat during periods of armed conflict.' As such, IL governs
conduct of states engaged in armed conflict, and, more recently, has
developed to govern the conduct of some non-state armed groups during
conflict periods.'69
As discussed above, IHL has served as the body of law
substantively applied in international criminal tribunals, while at the
same time these tribunals have helped to develop this body of law
progressively. In the context of international criminal law, IHL
"protects" through general and specific deterrence and by threat and
imposition of punishment, as charges are adjudicated by criminal
tribunals and guilty perpetrators are punished.
In the case of the Commission, 1IL also has the potential to protect
in both a similar and different sense. The obligation to provide effective
measures to prevent (in this case, rape) and the corresponding regime of
state responsibility also serve a deterrent purpose. Additionally, in the
claims context, reparations for violations of IHL have the potential to
alleviate the suffering of those who sustained damages in violation of
IL norms.'
This is especially true in the case of rape, where women tend to be
at even greater risk due to armed conflict."' While it may be the case that
in many situations that this increased level of insecurity is due to armed
conflict in general, rather than specific violations of IHL, reparations for
specific violations can have an ameliorative capacity even if the specific
violation is not compensable. IHL provisions seek to protect against the
dignity-destroying nature of sexual violence. Beyond the deleterious
physical, psychological, and emotional effects, rape can have widespread
consequences that put the very survival of the rape victim at risk. While
reparations may not be able to directly compensate specific physical,
emotional, or psychological damage, they may be able to address the
broader needs that persist for many women following this type of
168. See Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Reparations for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, 85 INT'L REv RED CROSS 529, 529 (2003).
169. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), June 8, 1977
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, availableathttp://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/475.
170. Gillard, supra note 168, at 530.
171. See, e g., Buss, supra note 142, at 148; see also Gillard, supra note 168, at 530. See
generaly Charlotte Lindsey, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Women, in LISTENING TO THE
SILENCES: WOMEN AND WAR 21-23, 25 (Helen Durham & Tracey Gurd eds., 2005); CHARLOTTE
LINDSEY, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WOMEN FACING WAR: ICRC STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF
ARMED CONFLICT ON WOMEN 51-52 (2001), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/pther/icrc.
002_0790_women facing-war.pdf.
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violation. Reparations, then, serve as a form of protection in that they
help ameliorate losses incurred by violations of IHL.
The Commission had occasion to advance the goals of IL on both
accounts with particular respect to raped civilians, but its success was
limited. Several components of the Commission's work with respect to
rape are in line with the protective goals of IHL. First, the determination
of an international norm that states are obligated to implement effective
measures to prevent rape should not be taken lightly. The Commission
notes that rape during times of armed conflict has far too long been
thought of as a by-product of war, and argues that such thinking is
coming to an end.
Second, the Commission's nuanced recognition of the difficulty of
obtaining evidence, gathering witness testimony, and sufficiently proving
claims of rape is noteworthy. The difficulties of presenting rape claims in
international tribunals are well known.172 Thus, the Commission's
evidentiary decisions are welcomed advances for IHL procedural
jurisprudence.
Third, the norm of effective prevention articulated by the
Commission is a nail in the coffin of this outmoded conception of rape as
a by-product of war. The strength of this norm, however, is tempered by
the corresponding evidentiary rules employed by the Commission.
Outcome-oriented presumptions, as employed here by the Commission,
may not actually strengthen the protective force of this obligation. By
creating what is essentially a strict liability regime for occurrences of
rape-that is, evidence of rape is presumptive evidence of the failure to
employ effective preventative measures-states may actually be
encouraged to accept rape as an inevitable by-product of war. If several
incidents of rape are sufficient for a finding of liability, then states may
not have the incentive to put protective measures into place, to train their
officers and subordinates on the illegality of rape and sexual violence
during conflict, and to expend resources in the prevention or punishment
of rape. This obligation might result in a utilitarian offset: the costs of
effective measures of prevention-if effective means near-absolute
prevention-may be too high to ever be implemented. The Commission
gives no guidance on what types of measures would have been effective,
nor does it explain what level of effectiveness would have been enough to
satisfy either state's obligation. Without such guidance, a state may
172. Cf Beth Van Schaack, Obstacles on the Road to Gender Justice: The International
Cnminal Tnbunal for Rwanda as Object Lesson, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER, Soc. Po'Y & L. 361, 364-
65 (2009).
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almost certainly face liability, and have no incentive to try to implement
effective measures.
Finally, the failure to provide a specific mechanism to provide the
monetary damages to the victims constitutes a failure to uphold the
protective goals of fIL. The claims put forward by Ethiopia and Eritrea
with respect to rape were based on violations of IHL suffered by
individuals. This is true even though the obligation breached was a
failure to provide effective measures to prevent rape. This obligation is
an obligation owed primarily to the individuals that IHL seeks to protect
and only an obligation owed to the other state indirectly. If the
individuals are unable to receive monetary damages awarded based on
their incurred damages, they have not received the full scope of
protection afforded by IHL.
There are numerous ways in which the criminal and civil
applications of IIHL for perpetration of wartime rape fit together to
provide a more thorough protective regime for potential and actual
victims than could be achieved by either form of legal response on its
own. Criminal responsibility may serve a general deterrent purpose for
individual perpetrators, and, for those charged and convicted, there is a
measurable amount of specific deterrence. Moreover, LHL obligations
give states and the international legal community a legal form through
which to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions.
State responsibility and international claims mechanisms can hold
states accountable to one another for breaching obligations to protect
civilians from rape during times of armed conflict. Damage awards hold
out, at least, the possibility reparations might be made to those who
survive wartime rape and sexual violence so that they might be able to
find some measure of compensation to rebuild their lives.
However, the criminal and civil aspects of IHL do not come
together as a seamless whole. Significant gaps exist so that the
protections envisioned by IiHL for civilians during times of armed conflict
are not complete. It is not the case that one regime, be it criminal
tribunal applications of IHL or international claims mechanisms, is to
blame. Nor should one mechanism be preferred, or should one
mechanism be expected to extend or reinvent itself in such a way to fill
the gaps. Rather, the important task is to identify the gaps in order to
bring the two regimes closer together, thereby increasing the protection
of IHL for those at risk. With respect to IHL prohibitions against rape,
one way to assess the extent of the gaps is to evaluate the work of the
Commission in light of the jurisprudential progress made in the
international criminal tribunals to define and refine the IHL doctrine, and
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push international law beyond the perception that rape is a by-product of
armed conflict.
B. Does the Commission 's Jurisprudence on RapeAdvance the
Progress Made on the Nature of Sexual Violence DurngArmed
Conflict?
The first Part of this Article charts the change in the international
jurisprudence and understanding of rape. A well-developed set of norms
prohibiting rape and sexual violence now exists in international law. This
change has paralleled a change in the conceptualization of the nature of
rape and sexual violence. What was, in the near past, often considered a
spoil of war, a by-product of armed conflict, a problem of troop
discipline, or a property rights violation, is now properly considered a
violent crime against the dignity, autonomy, and bodily integrity of the
victim.
The Commission recognized these developments and sought to
adjudicate the rape claims in a way that reflected these important
changes. It is, however, not clear that their decisions have advanced the
conceptual posture of rape within IHL jurisprudence. By focusing on the
breach of the obligation to employ effective measures to prevent rather
than on the rape itself, the Commission fails to point its analytic lens at
the nature of the violation and the essence of the damages. Instead, the
Commission focused solely on an obligation to prevent rape. While the
obligation to provide effective measures to prevent rape should not be
understated nor overlooked, such focus-without damage awards and a
mechanism to allocate the awards specifically designed to redress those
damages actually incurred by victims-may have the unintended effect
of backsliding to property-based conceptions of rape.
By focusing on the obligation to prevent, without focusing on the
prohibitions against sexual violence, damage awards are decoupled from
actual damages. By awarding damages in a mechanism that allows offset
by the states and does not mandate damage awards to be paid to victims,
the Commission implicitly treats rape in a way not unlike the way that it
treated property claims.
Historically, mass claims processes have primarily been used to
adjudicate claims of property damage, and some inertia may exist with
respect to this function."' But in the case of international claims for
173. See Richard M. Buxbaum, A Legal History of International Reparations, 23
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 314, 317, 322, 324, 331 (2005); see also Roland Bank & Friederike Foltz,
Lump Sum Agreements, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. t 19, http://www.
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cases of rape, courts and tribunals should take care to avoid procedural
moves and award mechanisms that reinforce property-based conceptions
of rape by failing to address the violation of human dignity. While it may
be true under international law that a state is injured when a violation of
IL occurs on its territory,"4 there are also strong indications that states
owe obligations to certain individuals who suffer damages, and are
obligated to make full compensation when breach of an obligation
occurs.75
Reparations may not be able to directly restore the dignity taken by
the physical, emotional, and psychological damage of the violation. But
reparations may be able to help restore the social and economic damage
incurred by a rape survivor. Buss, in her analysis of the paradigm shift
from rape as an inevitable by-product of war to the instrumentalist
conception of rape as a weapon of war, highlights one important
symbolic role occupied by women during times of conflict. Citing Jean
Bethke Elshtain, Buss argues that within nationalist ideology, women
become "'symbolic representations' of the body politic, to be protected
during war as the very nation itself. Women thus become the embodied
boundaries of the nation-state, and as such, are targets for violence
directed against a national collectivity.""'
This insight may help answer the question of why rape occurs
during conflict-and even why rape might become a strategic policy-
but it also recalls property-based conceptions of rape. The rape of a
"symbolic representation," sexual violence against the embodiment of
the nation-state, no matter how individualized the body, is an abstract act
perpetrated against an idea, not a person. This abstraction obscures
violence against autonomy, bodily integrity, and human dignity.
Framing obligations with respect to rape during armed conflict as
an obligation existing between states, rather than an obligation owed to
individuals, perpetuates this abstraction. International state responsibility
for the failure to provide effective measures to prevent rape may provide
some level of protection for those at risk of rape and sexual violence
during conflict as it imposes an obligation upon states to create, employ,
and enforce measures to prevent rape. But this obligation operates at the
state-to-state level, and adjudication of state responsibility for breaches
mpepil.com/subscriber article?id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e842 (subscription required)
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
174. SeeSassli, supra note 166, at 423.
175. See Draft Articles, supm note 118, art. 34.
176. Buss, supm note 142, at 148. For a brief survey of theories on why rape occurs
during armed conflict, see Chinkin, supmi note 146, at 328.
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of this obligation alone-without parallel or additional adjudication of
the claims of specific victims-abstracts away from the violation of
dignity and autonomy that lies at the heart of rape and sexual violence.
Moreover, awarding damages to states with no specific provision for how
those damages might actually reach victims predicates damages on the
breach of an obligation between states, and not on the damage incurred
by victims. While this might hold states accountable to one another-if
such accountability is not undermined by the unintended incentives
discussed above-it provides no level of relief to survivors who are most
in need of reparations.
At best, a state-to-state obligation, with no mechanism for damage
awards to be rendered to individual survivors, yields only indirect
protection to individuals. In other words, the obligation between states to
provide effective measures to prevent rape during conflict provides
protection only through the threat of international responsibility for the
breach of the obligation. It makes one state accountable to the other
state, but not to those who bear the damage of the breach.
Without specific provisions to provide reparations to victims,
Ethiopian and Eritrean survivors of rape will not even have a "rough"
justice. The restrictions of time, resources, and mandates levied upon the
Commission-and even the financial restrictions of impoverished states
like Ethiopia and Eritrea-cannot be ignored. But these restrictions
should not influence the adjudication of claims for damages incurred as a
result of violations of THL. Where norms are designed to protect
individuals during armed conflict and where obligations exist to provide
reparation in the case of breach, decisions should reflect those norms as
closely as possible. This means that adjudication of violations must be
viewed through the lens of violations of human dignity and not property.
Moreover, these violations must be redressed at the individual level and
not allowed to be offset at the state level. Anything less, even in the
context of claims processes, is to retrogress to outmoded views of rape
during armed conflict.
VI. CONCLUSION
The work of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission has made
many noteworthy contributions to the jurisprudence of international
humanitarian law claims. Especially with respect to claims for rape
during armed conflict, the Commission's evidentiary decisions and good-
faith efforts to ensure that sexual violence no longer be considered an
inevitable by-product of war are commendable.
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Despite these important contributions, given the history of the
perception of sexual violence during armed conflict, the gendered
perception of harm incurred during conflict, and the evolution of
international norms with respect to sexual violence, a critical analysis of
the Commission's work is necessary. While important distinctions
remain between adjudicating international criminal charges against
individuals and claims brought in the international claims context, the
goals of IHL may be more effectively realized through the
complementarity of the international criminal law and the international
claims processes. In the case of the Commission, some of this
complementarity was evident, but more could have been done. Several
aspects framing the norm to provide effective measures to prevent rape
solely as an obligation between states, rather than as an obligation owed
to individuals, decoupling state responsibility from the actual damages
(that is, the suffering) incurred by victims, and the lack of specific
provision for damages to be paid to victims-fell short of the protections
granted by IHL. Without direct reparations, rape survivors are denied a
remedy that could help them overcome the broader, even if not the
specific, violations of dignity that result from sexual violence.
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